

01014

1962/11/03

109. Memorandum for the Director, "Your Briefings of the
NSC Executive Committee," 3 November 1962

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: *Your Briefings of the NSC Executive Committee*

1. On 23 October you gave a brief intelligence report saying that construction at the sites was continuing. Lundahl briefed on the most recent photographs. It was at this meeting that it was left to your discretion to consider the matter of disclosures of photos and you sent Lundahl and Cline to New York to assist Stevenson.

At an evening meeting that day you briefed on military developments within the WARSAW Pact countries, describing an increased level of Soviet military communications.

2. On 24 October you briefed on the continued rapid progress in the completion of the missile sites and of the fact that 22 Soviet missile ships were en route to Cuba.

3. On 25 October you told the Group there had been no change in the construction pace; you covered the Watch Committee report, *starting* that Soviet armed forces were increasing *and their* state of readiness; you described the Soviet ships *en* route to Cuba carrying helicopters; *and you* covered the departure of a Cubana plane from Canada to Havana; and also briefed on the turn-around of 15 of the 22 Soviet ships.

At an evening meeting you briefed in detail on the status of Soviet shipping [REDACTED]

4. On 26 October, which was attended by Stevenson, you covered the Watch Committee report which concluded that Soviet armed forces had completed measures for an alert but that there were no significant deployments. You covered the *news* continued construction at the missile bases, estimating that it had cost the Soviet less than one-half as much to put these in Cuba rather than build ICBM's in the USSR. You summarized the status of shipping and made the point that *non-blockade non-B* ships could carry Soviet arms, and you reviewed briefly Castro's apprehensive reaction to the US quarantine. *He seems to fear an uprising.*

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

180016.9

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- 2 -

5. On 27 October you told the Group that three of the four MRBM sites at San Cristobal and two sites at Sagual Grande appeared fully operational and covered the latest Watch Committee report on Soviet military developments.

6. On 28 October you agreed to lend all appropriate support to the effort to brief General Rikhye at the UN. You directed that Ray Cline participate in the draft reply to Khrushchev's letter. You asked that Cline insure supporting your position ^{that} the removal of the missiles should not end by giving Castro a sanctuary.

7. On 29 October you covered the following:

a. Construction continues;

b.

c.

d.

e. The Watch Committee report was noted. There was no sign of change in Soviet military preparedness.

f. You mentioned the point that press stories based on special intelligence must be prevented.

After the meeting you talked with the President and Secretary Rusk emphasizing that Castro ^{must} remain in Cuba with a greater security and this is the situation we must be careful of.

8. On 30 October you told the Group available data does not indicate preparation for dismantling and noted continued construction of nuclear storage bunkers. Many of the missile ~~erectors~~ ^{erectors} had been removed and are no longer visible. You covered the shipping situation and pointed to the

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

~~ONLY~~
-3- ~~EYES ONLY~~

danger of sabotage in Latin American countries urging that all Embass^{ies} and consulates be alerted. You also covered the Watch Committee Report which concluded that Soviet armed forces remain on alert and you reviewed briefly current developments in Laos, South Vietnam, and India, Soviet nuclear subs, and Soviet nuclear tests and you pointed out that our ability to analyze these tests had been impaired by DOD withdrawal of collection vehicles.

9. On 31 October you told the Group that there was continued evidence of construction and concealment but noted that evidence that some of the launchers had been moved from the MRBM sites might be construed^{as} with the first step at dismantling. You further pointed out that photos^{were} compared with those taken on Saturday and ordered^{to} cease were probably not issued until Sunday night or Monday morning. There was discussion of the "intelligence gap" and you reviewed the Cuban SNIE of 19 September, noting that it failed to fully appraise^{all} reports available.

10. On 1 November you briefed on details concerning U Thant's mission to Havana. You pointed out that Cuba probably would engage in reconnaissance with anti aircraft fire since they had^{claimed} that they had developed a pattern of reconnaissance. Evidence indicates Soviets in command and control of SAM system. You noted there had been no reconnaissance in Eastern Cuba since 23 October. Decision was made at this meeting to cover ~~Isle 28~~, 1L-28 base of Sin Julian and MRBM sites.

11. On 2 November you told the Group there was evidence that the Soviets were dismantling missiles, but the assembly of ~~Isle~~ 28 bombers was continuing.

TOP SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~